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Abstract 
The paper explores the domestic and international context of Hungary’s emerging 
international development policy. Specifically, it looks at three factors that may 
influence how this policy operates: membership in the European Union and potential 
‘Europeanization’, Hungary’s wider foreign policy strategy, and the influence of 
domestic stakeholders. In order to uncover how these factors affect the country’s 
international development policy, semi structured interviews were carried out with the 
main stakeholders. The main conclusions are: (1) While accession to the EU did play a 
crucial role in re-starting Hungary’s international development policy, membership in 
the integration has had little effect since then. (2) International development policy 
seems to mainly serve Hungary’s regional strategic foreign policy and economic 
interests, and not global development goals. (3) Although all domestic development 
stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still seems to play a 
dominating role. Convergence to European requirements and best practices is therefore 
clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of non-
governmental stakeholders.  
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Hungarian international development co-operation: context, stakeholders and 
performance 
 
1. Introduction 
The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, namely the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the three Baltic countries, and later Romania and 
Bulgaria all became members of the international aid donor community in the past 
decade. In fact, in 2011 we could celebrate the tenth anniversary of the re-emergence of 
these policies in CEE, as in 2001 some of the countries above accepted their first 
official documents relating to international development. Therefore, it is increasingly 
inappropriate to call these countries ‘new’ donors, although their development policies 
are still very different than those of the older, more established Western donors, or 
internationally agreed ‘best practices’. 
 
This paper takes a closer look at one of these emerging donors, Hungary. Hungary was 
one of the first CEE countries to re-create its international development policy between 
2001 and 2003, but in the past years activity in this field seems to have stagnated. There 
seems to be no clear strategy or direction for the future and no discussion on how and 
why Hungary should aid poorer countries. Resources spent on development cooperation 
are low and stagnating, public attention on the topic is negligible and there is no 
political discourse. This current state of affairs can only partly be explained by the weak 
economic performance of Hungary and government austerity measures. The paper 
argues that in order to gain a better understanding of Hungary’s international 
development policy, one must look at other factors. The main goal of the paper 
therefore is to explore the context of Hungarian international development cooperation 
and its implications on the practice and performance of the country’s international 
development policy. I discuss three contextual sources of influence on Hungary’s 
external assistance policy: membership in the EU, wider foreign policy strategy and the 
influence of domestic stakeholders. Specifically, I formulate the following three 
research questions: (1) Has membership in the European Union had any effect on the 
policy area? (2) Is the country’s international development policy affected by wider 
strategic foreign policy goals? (3) How do the interests and power-relations of domestic 
development stakeholders affect Hungary’s international development policy?  
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The main conclusions of the paper are that membership in the EU has had little 
noticeable effect in shaping Hungary’s development policy since 2004; international 
development policy seems to serve Hungarian external political and economic interests; 
and that although all stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still 
seems to play a dominating role. Convergence to European requirements and best 
practices is clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of non-
governmental stakeholders. These issues make the creation of a unified vision on why 
and how Hungary should provide aid to less fortunate countries difficult. 
 
All three of the contextual sources of influence could constitute separate research 
agendas. Therefore, this paper should be seen rather as an exploratory research, setting 
the agenda for future, more detailed inquires into the topic. Also, the paper does not 
attempt to describe Hungarian international policy in detail; rather it wishes to shed 
light on the dynamics behind the current state of affairs. Written material and data on 
Hungary’s international development policy is limited, and there has not been much 
scholarly work on the topic either. In order to overcome this problem, I carried out 
seven semi-structured qualitative interviews with representatives of the various 
stakeholders. My interviewees included a senior policy official and a desk officer, as 
well as a former mid-level director, all from the Directorate of International 
Development at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also interviewed a senior desk officer, 
working on issues related to tied aid credits from the Ministry of National Economy. 
My last three respondents are three experts working at various Hungarian development 
NGO’s, both in policy and ‘on the field.’ For reasons of confidentiality, their identities 
are not revealed. 
 
The contribution of the paper to the literature is that it expands the rather scarce 
academic literature on development policies in the CEE countries, and provides an 
approach for understanding the evolution of the policy area in the case of Hungary. This 
sets the agenda for future, more detailed research, and can be applied to other CEE 
countries as well. The paper is structured around the three topics introduced above. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the history of Hungary’s international development policy and 
the present challenges it faces. Section 3 analyzes the effects EU membership has had 
(or has failed to have) on Hungary’s international development policy. Section 4 
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discusses the domestic policy context, and section 5 looks at the interests and relative 
power and influence of the development stakeholders. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Hungary’s international development policy: history and present challenges 
The history of development policies in the CEE countries and the current challenges 
they face is rather well documented. Most studies focus on the early beginnings 
(Dauderstädt, ed. 2002), the difficulties and deficiencies faced by the CEE donors 
(Bucar and Mrak, 2007) and more recently the interactions between these new donors 
and the European Union (Carbone, 2004; Lightfoot, 2008; 2010; Horky, 2010). In case 
of Hungary, the works of Kiss (2002; 2007) and Paragi (2010) are the most important 
sources, as well as the review by HUN-IDA (2004). In this section I do not wish to 
repeat the findings of this literature, rather just give a brief overview of how 
development policy emerged in Hungary and what difficulties the country faces today.  
 
All CEE countries, including Hungary, had international development policies during 
Communism. While there has hardly been any detailed academic research on these pre-
1989 development policies, the most important characteristic is easy to identify: heavy 
influence of the Soviet Union’s geostrategic objectives. This included providing 
assistance mainly to Soviet allies or developing countries with heavily leftist 
governments; no clear distinction between military and development aid; a high reliance 
on technical assistance and tied aid; and the extensive usage of scholarships (for more 
details, see Kiss, 2002; HUN-IDA, 2004). According to some estimates, the resources 
Hungary devoted to foreign assistance reached 0.7 percent of the country’s national 
income in the late seventies, although this cannot be compared to aid expenditures today 
due to methodological differences. In most CEE donors, including Hungary, the impact 
of the Communist-era development policy can be identified to this date (Szent-Iványi 
and Tétényi 2008).  
 
After the end of the Cold War, Hungary terminated its international development 
policy, and turned from being a donor country into a recipient of foreign aid. During the 
1990’s, there was no active bilateral development cooperation, only smaller ad hoc 
contributions to multilateral development organizations. Hungary re-started its 
international development policies due to external pressure, stemming from 
membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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in 1996 and accession to the EU in 2004. The first strategic document on international 
development cooperation was accepted in 2001 by the government and the first 
Hungarian-financed aid projects started in 2003. Due to Hungary’s historical, political, 
financial and economic conditions, the international development policy it created took 
on a very different nature than the ones the member countries of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have. Although it is very difficult to talk 
about a single best practice in bilateral development policies among the OECD DAC 
members, as all countries have their own national characteristics, still in the past decade 
an international academic and political consensus has emerged on the desired traits of 
effective national bilateral aid policies. This consensus includes increasing resources 
spent on aid, the concepts of partnership and ownership, untying aid, better coordination 
between donors, aligning donor activities with recipient systems, decreasing 
administrative burdens of recipients, a larger emphasis on evaluation and results etc. 
(See for example the outcomes of the Monterrey Conference in 2002, the Rome-Paris-
Accra-Seoul process on aid effectiveness, or in the case of the EU, the European 
Consensus on Development accepted in 2006).  
 
Hungary’s aid policy on the other hand is heavily donor driven and is characterized by 
low amounts spent on bilateral cooperation, a high share of tied aid, the proliferation of 
small projects, inefficient delivery structures and the almost total lack of evaluation 
(Paragi 2010). Aid is given mostly to middle income neighboring countries, which 
implies that poverty reduction is not really a goal (Szent-Iványi 2010). Table 1 shows 
the amounts Hungary spent on foreign aid between 2003 and 2010, and compares it to 
the performance of the other CEE countries and the OECD DAC average. Hungary 
spent the most on international development in 2006, when official development 
assistance (ODA) reached 0.13% of gross national income. This was however mainly 
due to one-off items, such debt relief to Iraq and Ethiopia. In the past years we can see a 
clear stagnation of resources spent on development. The member states of the EU have 
reiterated the need to increase resources devoted to international development, but the 
global economic and financial crisis which began in 2008 has definitely curbed these 
ambitions. In 2010, Hungarian ODA was 0.09% of GNI, falling well short of the 0.17% 
target, set within the EU back in 2005 (Bucar and Mrak, 2007). 
 
Table 1. ODA/GNI levels among the Central and Eastern European donors 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Czech Republic 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Estonia .. 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 ..
Hungary 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09
Latvia 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 ..
Lithuania 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 ..
Poland 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08
Romania .. .. .. .. .. 0.08 0.09 ..
Slovakia 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Slovenia .. .. 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.13
OECD DAC 
average 
0.25 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.31 
 
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
The stagnation of the ODA/GNI level is a symptom of a more general lack of progress 
within Hungary’s international development policy, which cannot be explained solely 
with the deficiency of resources. The law for regulating international development 
cooperation has not been passed as of mid-2011 and has been “under preparation” for 
five years. No reforms have been started to change the inefficient institutional setting 
for aid delivery, in which many line-ministries are involved with only weak central 
coordination. The evaluation of projects and learning from their experience is hardly 
given any emphasis, and no attempts have been made to strengthen this. No attempts 
have been made to start a public discourse on the issue either. The following three 
sections of the paper map three sources of potential influence on Hungarian 
development cooperation in order to explain this stagnation: the effects of EU 
membership, the foreign policy context and stakeholder interests and relations. 
 
3. The effects of EU membership 
‘Europeanization’ has become a very popular concept in the past decade for 
understanding changes and dynamics in various policy areas due to membership in the 
EU or the prospect of it. During the accession process of the CEE countries to the EU, 
requirements were voiced that these countries should contribute to international 
development efforts – thus, the EU was a crucial factor in the re-emergence of the 
development policies of the CEE countries, and this has made the concept of 
Europeanization an increasingly popular framework to study these new policies (Vittek 
and Lightfoot 2009; Lightfoot 2010; Horky 2010). The concept can be useful for 
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structuring the discussion on how EU membership has affected Hungarian development 
policy, so I introduce it briefly. 
 
Europeanization is most generally understood as the process through which countries 
adopt formal and informal European rules and policies (Graziano and Vink 2007: 7; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 7). The basic model on Europeanization, 
advocated by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 6-12) states that laws (institutions, 
methods, processes, norms, behavioral rules etc.) originating from the EU level may be 
incongruous with relevant legislation of the nation states. Depending on how large this 
gap is, pressures arise for the nation state to adapt to the ‘European way’ of doing 
things. However, these pressures are mediated through domestic institutions, and a 
multitude of factors will influence whether and how the country actually changes its 
policies. In the end some national institutional and policy outcome will emerge, which 
may eliminate or reduce the original misfit, or even leave it unchanged. The pressures 
for change therefore may still remain, and the entire process starts again in a cyclical 
manner.  
 
The two main channels for Europeanization to happen are through conditionality and 
socialization (Checkel 2001, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Juncos 2010). In 
case of the former, member states are obliged to comply with any hard legislation 
accepted by the EU institutions. The EU can formulate explicit conditions towards 
accession countries as well, and often it can have an even larger leverage on these 
countries than it has on its own members (i.e. their accession process can be stalled if 
they do not comply). On the other hand, a more constructivist approach to 
Europeanization emphasizes the importance of longer term socialization and social 
learning. This involves the internalization of European values and formal rules, as well 
as the gradual development of the conviction that that is the only proper way to act. 
While Europeanization through conditionality can be rather explicit and quick, social 
learning is a slow process and also much more difficult to identify in practice. The two 
approaches however, while relying on different theoretical backgrounds, are not 
mutually exclusive. In policy areas where conditionality and coercion are not possible, 
social learning can be the only channel for Europeanization to occur.  
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The question therefore is: is there evidence of Europeanization in Hungary’s 
development policy? In the past two decades the EU has attempted to considerably 
increase its influence on bilateral member state development policies, but the EU also 
had a chance to prescribe explicit criteria during the accession negotiations that 
Hungarian development policy must meet.  
 
The influence on member states comes from several sources. The Treaty of Maastricht 
introduced qualitative requirements for both EU-level and member state development 
policies with the concepts of complementarily, coherence and coordination (the so-
called 3C’s, see Hoebink 2004). Concerning quantitative requirements, in 2002 the 
European Council reaffirmed that member states must increase their aid spending to 
0.7% of their gross national incomes by 2015, and set an intermediate goal of 0.39% by 
2006. In 2005, a new intermediate goal was established for 2010 of 0.56%, and a 
separate goal was set for the new member states of 0.17% (Bucar and Mrak 2007: 7). 
Also, in 2005 a joint statement by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, 
entitled the ‘European Consensus on Development’, created a new framework for the 
EU’s common development policy and also laid down many requirements for the 
individual member states. Other requirements include untying aid (European 
Commission 2002), focusing aid on Africa, increasing aid effectiveness (European 
Commission 2006; 2007) and implementing internationally agreed best practices such 
as the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda (Council of the European Union 2011).  
 
Europeanization in the short term can be most effective through explicit conditionality. 
However, almost all the requirements the EU voices towards member states in the field 
of international development fall into the category of soft law, i.e. they are mainly only 
recommendations. The EU could have formulated conditions during Hungary’s 
accession negotiations, but it did not. It is well documented that international 
development (included in the negotiating chapter on trade) was neglected during the 
accession negotiations and no specific requirements were voiced, besides the fact that 
Hungary, as all other CEE countries, must create such a policy (Fodor 2003). According 
to one of the foreign ministry official interviewed, the EU missed its only possibility to 
exert any true influence on the course Hungary’s emerging international development 
policy took. Without any explicit conditions however, there was no reason for Hungary 
to adopt the practices advocated by the EU.  
  9
 
The actual hard requirements the EU has today are all either highly technical, such as 
the classification of aid projects and reporting on specific issues such as policy 
coherence, or related to financial issues, such as contribution to the European 
Development Fund. In this sense, according to a ministry official interviewed, there is 
evidence of Europeanization, but it is rather limited and has no significant influence on 
actual policies. 
 
If there is no explicit conditionality and no hard pressure, that would leave socialization 
as the main channel for the Europeanization of Hungary’s development policy. Officials 
at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and other line ministries involved 
in international development of course have continuous interactions with the EU, as 
they take part in the comitology system of the integration. They frequently interact with 
officials from other member states and from the European Commission. It is very 
difficult to draw any conclusion on the extent of social learning, but there are many 
factors hindering it, such as the high turnover of MFA staff and the perceptions 
dominating in the ministry on what interests and comparative advantages Hungary has. 
According to my interviews, the perception that Hungarian interests dictate a different 
type of international development policy than what the EU tries to advocate seems 
dominant among the ministry officials. All the ministry officials I talked with seem to 
believe that Hungarian development policy should not follow blindly the requirements 
of the EU, but should take Hungary’s situation into account as well. For example, they 
maintain that Hungary should receive economic and political benefits from giving aid 
and thus tying aid to exports is justified. They do acknowledge that many issues that the 
EU raises, such as placing a greater emphasis on evaluation and feedback are generally 
important, but Hungary has other priorities, such as building a constituency for aid. As 
these issues are related to the other two sources of influence on Hungarian external 
development policy, they will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
European values and norms on development are therefore far from being internalized by 
the Hungarian MFA officials. They have learned to “talk the talk”, but my impression 
from the interviews was that they mostly see the various committee meetings as terrains 
for national interest implementation and not opportunities for themselves to learn and 
adapt.  
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In sum, the current practice of Hungarian development policy is rather far from the soft 
requirements of the European Union. Conditionality is only present on the technical 
level and has had no real effect on policies. There seems to be little evidence for social 
learning either, but this can be due to the fact that Hungary has not been a member of 
the EU long enough for the mechanics of social learning to kick in. I conclude that there 
is little evidence of Europeanization in Hungary’s international development policy. 
 
3. Foreign Policy Strategy and Development 
I now turn to a second source of influence on Hungarian international development 
policy: the wider foreign policy context. It is widely agreed that international foreign aid 
is a tool of foreign policy, and can be used to serve specific foreign policy goals, such 
influencing other countries, building alliances, creating stability and increasing global 
security (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2005). In this section I briefly 
identify the main strategic goals of Hungary’s foreign policy, and then look at how 
these relate to the current allocation of foreign aid. 
 
After the end of Communism, a consensual Hungarian foreign policy strategy emerged. 
This strategy rested on three pillars: (1) integration in the Euro-Atlantic community; (2) 
the protection of ethnic Hungarians living abroad; and (3) good relations with 
neighboring countries. While this strategy served Hungary well throughout the nineties, 
it became obsolete as Hungary joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in 1999 and the EU 2004. It was also realized that protecting ethnic Hungarians (most 
of them living in the neighboring countries) inevitably led to conflicts with the 
neighbors, and so the two second priorities needed to be reconciled in some manner. 
After a long preparatory work involving more than 100 experts and academics, a new 
foreign policy strategy was accepted by the government in 2008, meant to be valid until 
2020.1 
 
The new strategy also rests on three pillars, which to some extent refine the three pillars 
of the previous strategy and also expand them (Hungarian Government 2008). Pillar one 
                                                 
1 The current Hungarian government, in power since 2010 and led by the right-wing FIDESZ, has 
signaled the need for a new strategy. However, work on it has not started and no information on future 
directions can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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is entitled “Competitive Hungary in the European Union,” which details Hungary’s 
interests in relation to the EU. These include maintaining and deepening the integration, 
maintaining community solidarity, keeping the integration open (including future 
enlargements) and increasing Europe’s competitive position and global influence. Pillar 
two is “Successful Hungarians in the region”, which basically attempts to reconcile the 
contradictions between protecting the interests of Hungarian minorities and good 
relations with the neighbors. This pillar stresses regional cooperation for mutual 
benefits, an emphasis on the stability and development of the Balkans and the Eastern 
countries (and supporting their EU and NATO accession), and also the need for 
Hungary to serve as a major investor and trading partner in the region. The support of 
Hungarian minorities is a further key issue here, but it is placed into an EU framework, 
and the strategy also emphasizes the protection of non-Hungarian minorities living in 
Hungary. Finally, pillar three in entitled “Responsible Hungary in the world”. This 
objective includes contributing to global peace, the spread of democratic values and 
human rights, promoting global governance, combating climate change, reducing global 
poverty and increasing global security. 
 
The question is how international development policy relates to these three pillars. Due 
to the nature of development policy, and the requirements of the EU, it should mainly 
be serving the strategic objectives outlined in pillar three, i.e. issues like global poverty 
reduction. Hungary’s foreign policy strategy includes three paragraphs on international 
development cooperation, which seem to reinforce this idea. In these paragraphs, a 
reference is made to the Millennium Development Goals and how Hungary supports the 
efforts of the international donor community in achieving them; a commitment to 
increase ODA and reach the 0.17 and 0.33 percent ODA/GNI targets set by the Council 
of the EU for 2010 and 2015. The third paragraph is meant to discuss the geographic 
focus of Hungarian aid, which besides mentioning the importance of Africa, emphasizes 
maintaining a close relationship with Southern and Eastern Europe and the Far East.  
 
However, based on data on Hungarian aid allocation and interviews with ministry staff 
and NGO’s, I argue that Hungarian international development policy mainly serves 
pillar two of the strategy, i.e. helping Hungary and Hungarians become ‘successful’ in 
the CEE region. Let us look at aid allocation data to illustrate this point. I use data from 
the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s report on the implementation of official development 
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and humanitarian assistance in 2010 (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011), but 
the conclusions are valid for earlier years as well (Szent-Ivanyi 2010). In 2010, Hungary 
spent 113 million US dollars on ODA, of which approximately 26.6 million were 
channeled bilaterally. Table 2 shows a breakdown of these bilateral funds. 
 
Table 2. The regional allocation of Hungary’s bilateral aid in 2010 
Region 
Amount  
(thousand dollars) 
Share in total  
(%) 
South-East Europe and CIS 8 892 33 
of which: support to 
Hungarian minorities 
3 927 15 
Afghanistan 5 555 21 
Africa 762 3 
Other regions 2 932 11 
Costs of refugees in Hungary 6 096 23 
Unallocated* 2 353 9 
Total bilateral 26 590 100 
*: The budget spent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not broken down in the report. Most of it was 
probably allocated to Afghanistan, and it also includes the amounts spent on humanitarian aid. 
Source: calculations of the author, based on Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011: 36-47) 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, countries in the Balkans and in the former Soviet region 
receive the highest chunk of Hungary’s bilateral aid. A significant portion (15%) of 
these resources is actually channeled to support ethic Hungarians in Serbia and the 
Ukraine. Only 3% of Hungary’s bilateral aid is channeled to African countries, and even 
that is mainly in the form of scholarships to Hungary, so some may argue that it benefits 
Hungary even more in the form of brain drain than it does the African countries. The 
single largest receiving county is however Afghanistan, where Hungary, as a part of the 
NATO coalition is in charge of a provincial reconstruction team, and therefore has an 
international obligation to contribute to the development of the country. Looking at the 
allocation data, it is clear that it is more in-line with second pillar foreign policy 
objectives than it is with global poverty reduction. Developing countries (with the 
exception of Afghanistan), where poverty is a huge issue, democratic values and the 
respect for human rights have much to ask for and the quality of governance is low 
receive much lower amounts of aid than middle income neighboring countries.  
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My interviews basically reinforced this conclusion based on aid allocation data. 
Respondents from the MFA mentioned that Hungary’s main comparative advantages 
and foreign policy interests dictate giving aid to the neighboring countries, and to those 
countries which Hungarian actors “know well”, the latter clearly implying countries 
with which Hungary has had more extensive development relations during 
Communism, such as Vietnam, the Palestinian Authority, or Yemen. Hungarian NGO’s 
and private companies clearly have some advantages in the neighboring countries, but 
giving aid to such partners is also underpinned by foreign and security policy 
considerations, such as the need for regional stability. One respondent cited the case of 
the Kosovo war in 1999, which had an adverse affect on foreign investments to 
Hungary. The official I interviewed from the Ministry of National Economy mainly 
emphasized economic interests, saying that foreign aid should be used as a tool to pave 
the way for Hungarian exports and investments in the neighboring countries.  
 
Hungary is not perceived to have any comparative advantage in giving aid to Africa. As 
mentioned by an MFA respondent, Africa is for “the big players”. Building a presence 
in Africa in order to deliver efficient development aid has high fixed costs, which 
Hungary cannot afford. As Hungary currently only has two embassies in Sub-Saharan 
African countries (in South Africa and Kenya), one can hardly argue that the continent 
figures highly among foreign policy and international development considerations. 
 
NGO respondents complained that poverty reduction is not a true goal of Hungary’s 
international development policy, because if it were, Hungary would devote a larger 
attention to regions were the return on aid in terms of people lifted out of poverty would 
by higher. It was also mentioned that the lack of the MFA’s attention towards Africa is 
highly frustrating and makes the work of NGO’s dedicated towards the region highly 
difficult.  
 
One may argue that the relatively large amounts spent in Afghanistan can be attributed 
to the third pillar of Hungary’s foreign policy strategy, and so can multilateral aid 
(which makes up some 75% percent of Hungary’s total ODA). However, the Hungarian 
mission in Afghanistan seems to be perceived as an international obligation, and much 
of Hungary’s multilateral aid is based on compulsory membership fees, and so the 
country has little freedom in deciding how much it pays and how it is spent. References 
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in the foreign policy strategy to global poverty, the MDG’s, or the respect for human 
rights may thus be a further example of Hungarian politicians and officials having 
learned to ‘talk the talk’ of international development, but they are not supported 
strongly by aid allocation.  
 
Summing up this section and answering the second research question, it is clear that 
Hungary’s international development policy is affected by wider foreign policy, as 
foreign aid is used to a large extent to promote Hungarian political and economic 
interests in the region, such as maintaining stability, helping ethnic Hungarians and 
building economic opportunities for Hungarian companies. Aid is used to a much lesser 
extent in decreasing global poverty, promoting the respect for human rights, i.e. the 
goals elaborated in pillar three of the country’s foreign policy strategy.  
 
4. Development stakeholders  
Finally I turn to a third potential source of influence on international development 
policy: the power relations between domestic stakeholders and their interests. The 
literature on how domestic dynamics affect international development policy in a 
country is still rather sparse, and these dynamics are not well understood. It is clear that 
political parties may have their own preferences, for example socialist parties may put a 
larger emphasis on solidarity (Hopkins 2000). Governing parties also react to the wider 
public opinion, although international development – like foreign policy in general – is 
not highly sensitive to it (Otter 2003).  
 
Within the government, the bureaucracies that take part in the day-to-day practice of 
international development are also major stakeholders. In fact, ministry officials can 
often have an important role in shaping policy, if political attention on the topic is low, 
or other interest groups are divided. In many OECD DAC countries it was the officials 
of the foreign ministries that pushed for reforms (or in case of the EU’s common 
development policy, the officials in the Commission played a leading role, see Carbone 
2007). Staff working on international development issues may be more concerned about 
aid effectiveness, because their prestige and future budget depends on the impact of 
their work. Thus, such staff may push for aid policies that are likely to increase the 
impact of aid. As I show below, this is not the case in Hungary. 
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Other stakeholders would mainly include those who are profiting from the 
“development business”, either financially or otherwise: private companies and 
development NGO’s. It is clear that one cannot lump NGO’s and private companies into 
a single group, as NGO’s – while also making a living from international development – 
do not seek profit, but rather have ethical and moral motivations. While private 
companies would clearly prefer aid practices which provide them with clear benefits 
(such as tied aid), NGO’s would advocate practices which are more beneficial for the 
partners, and so more in-line with international best practices. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I will briefly analyze the interests and relative power of 
two major development stakeholders in Hungary: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
development NGO’s. As mentioned earlier, international development issues are not 
part of the everyday political dialogue in Hungary, in fact they hardly ever are an issue. 
Political parties rarely raise the topic, which clearly indicates that they do not figure 
high on the political agenda. Due to this, I will not discuss the interests of political 
actors. While private companies that benefit from the aid business do exist in Hungary, 
their numbers are definitely low and they are difficult to identify, therefore I discuss 
their role only marginally. 
 
Due to the lack of political attention, the bureaucracy of the MFA may have larger 
possibilities to define how international development policy is shaped. The institutional 
set-up for international development in Hungary is highly fragmented: there is no single 
budget-line for foreign aid, almost all line-ministries are involved to some degree. The 
MFA has a central, coordinating role, and is also in charge of policy formulation. This 
coordination is carried out by two committees, one on the ministerial level and another 
on the level of officials and experts from various ministries working on international 
development. However, it became clear from my interviews that the MFA usually has 
no real power to influence other ministries on how they determine their priorities and 
how they spend their aid-budgets. All line ministries seem to have their own 
understanding of what foreign is or what it should be used for, and the MFA has no 
authority over their decisions. In 2010, the MFA actually only controlled about 25 
percent of bilateral ODA (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 36). 
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MFA officials did complain that much of their weakness and inability to influence other 
official actors is related to the lack of resources. They mentioned that their work has 
become very difficult in the past years, as Hungary has been facing strong needs to cut 
budget expenditures since 2006, which were exacerbated by the global crisis even 
further. My respondents from NGO’s added that the MFA also lacks expertise. An 
example they gave is that the turnaround of staff in the MFA is high and many of them 
do not seem to have a clear understanding of what international development should 
actually be about. 
 
Still, MFA officials, while acknowledging their constraints, did argue that they do 
everything they can to promote ‘Hungarian interests’, also on the EU-level. MFA 
officials were well aware of the fact that development policy tools often serve foreign 
policy interests other than global development (as discussed in section 3). In fact, the 
most surprising theme from the interviews was that development staff in the MFA 
actually seems to support this approach. They see no contradiction here, as they argued 
that Hungary should contribute to ‘regional’ development, as it has ‘comparative 
advantages’ in the region that other donors do not. According to this argument, poverty 
stricken regions like Sub-Saharan Africa are for donors who have more resources and 
also possess large and strong NGO’s and private companies to implement projects. 
Countries like Hungary however, who lack such large actors, need a different approach 
and must make the fostering of “local aid champions” a part of their policies. This 
theme emerged in many different forms during the interviews, and it was mostly the 
government officials, both from the MFA and the Ministry of National Economy who 
mentioned it, and not the NGO’s. One issue closely related to this was the European 
Development Fund (EDF) – one of my respondents emphasized the fact that Hungarian 
companies and individual experts are rarely competitive enough to win international 
development tenders and grants financed from the EDF. According to this logic, the 
money Hungary contributes to the Fund (almost €125 million between 2008 and 2013) 
is effectively lost for Hungary. Apparently the MFA even lobbied to change the rules of 
the EDF in order to provide some form of positive discrimination not only for 
companies and NGO’s from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, but 
also to ones from CEE. A second related issue is tied aid, which I have already 
mentioned, but should be reiterated here. The Ministry of National Economy, which is 
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in charge of the budget for tied-aid credits, perceives the various forms of tied aid solely 
as a tool for helping Hungarian enterprises to gain international presence.  
 
The need to use development policy to strengthen Hungarian development actors and 
serve foreign policy interests can explain why Hungary may resist pressures from the 
EU to untie aid, make a greater use program based aid, or use practices which may lead 
to greater ownership of the recipient. It can explain why the MFA failed to act as a 
catalyst in promoting adaptation to Europe. It is not clear however, whether this is 
actually a true conviction of MFA officials, or is it just rhetoric towards the government 
which they think can help them secure funds. 
 
Turning to development NGO’s, their weakness stemming in part from the Communist 
era and Hungary’s relatively lower incomes, is still a problem they must overcome. 
Financing their activities can often seem daunting: raising resources from donations has 
proven difficult, so they must rely on grants from the state or international 
organizations. The actions and power of development NGO’s however clearly depends 
on the amount of resources they can draw on, public support for their cause and also the 
way governments and ministry officials perceive the activities (and usefulness) of 
NGO’s. So what influence do NGO’s have Hungarian development policy making? 
Hungarian NGO’s, and their platform organization HAND are highly active in 
lobbying. HAND had a high profile during the Hungarian EU presidency in the first half 
of 2011, organizing a multitude of events and producing policy papers. Recently, a 
group of NGO’s drafted a strategy recommendation for the MFA on Hungarian 
engagement with Africa. NGO’s are also active in monitoring the government, as 
shown by the Aid Watch Report published in 2007 (Kiss 2007). They are also 
represented on an advisory committee that formally meets once a year to discuss the 
implementation of international development policy in the previous year and formulate 
recommendations for the future. According to the MFA’s report on the implementation 
of international development assistance in 2010, ministry officials also met formally 
every “one or two months” with representatives of HAND, and participated on events 
organized by the platform if invited (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 32). 
Therefore, it is clear that despite their lack of resources, NGO’s do try to shape 
Hungary’s international development policy, using both formal institutions and other 
means. They are committed to increasing the effectiveness of aid, focusing it more on 
  18
global poverty reduction, and also on increasing the transparency of the MFA and other 
ministries. 
 
Respondents from NGO’s however complained that the MFA does not treat them as 
partners. The flow of information from the ministry is slow at best and the opinions of 
NGO’s are rarely asked for. Their requests for information often take a long time to be 
processed, and grant applications often include unfavorable conditions for them, 
although in the past years due to austerity measures, the MFA’s budget for such grants 
has greatly decreased. The formal meetings seem to the NGO’s as little more than talk 
shops, as the problems raised are rarely followed up or acted upon. In fact, one 
respondent mentioned that the MFA seems to treat them with outright hostility, which 
seems to be in stark contrast with what ministry officials have said about the need to 
strengthen domestic NGO’s. This contradiction may be difficult to explain. While it 
may point to differences in perceptions, it may also hint towards the possibility that 
helping domestic actors is just rhetoric on the side of the MFA. Or – as one NGO 
respondent put it – the MFA simply does not like being told what to do. 
 
All these issues may imply that NGO’s may not be able to exert substantial influence on 
Hungary’s international development policy. Still, most NGO’s do agree that they did 
have an important impact in the past years in making the MFA more transparent and 
forcing it to disclose more information publicly on its activities. Summing up this 
section, both the MFA and development NGO’s have weaknesses, but it seems that the 
former is more powerful and thus able to have a larger influence on international 
development. However, the MFA seems to favor a policy which is aligned with 
Hungarian political and economic interests and not so much with global poverty 
reduction. The reasons for the MFA’s motivations are unclear. Higher level political 
interest in the issue and clear political guidance are greatly needed. 
 
Conclusions 
In the paper I have discussed three potential sources of influence which may have had a 
role in shaping Hungary’s emerging international development policy in the past 
decade: membership in the EU, Hungarian foreign policy priorities, and relationships 
and relative power of domestic stakeholders. These three factors are of course heavily 
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interrelated and all three must be taken into consideration when explaining the evolution 
of Hungary’s international development policy.   
 
The main conclusion that emerges is that in the past decade Hungary’s international 
development policy seems to have been guided mainly by Hungary’s political and 
economic interests, as the close links between the country’s foreign policy strategy and 
aid allocation demonstrate. Foreign aid is used to a much lesser extent to promote global 
development and poverty reduction. The requirements of the EU (which are mainly in 
the domain of soft law) in this policy area, which mandate the increase of aid 
effectiveness in decreasing global poverty have had little impact on Hungary’s practice. 
One potential reason for this can be found in the dynamics between the domestic 
stakeholders: development staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to support the 
current approach, and therefore the MFA has failed to act as a catalyst in orienting 
development policy towards a more global, poverty-focused approach. Higher level 
political guidance is lacking and development NGO’s are too weak to achieve any 
substantial influence. 
 
These dynamics may allow one to draw conclusions on the potential future evolution of 
Hungarian development cooperation. Most importantly, convergence to EU practices 
will likely be slow, and it will only take place as incomes and development experience 
in Hungary increase, allowing the country to play more of a global role, and also 
strengthening development actors. International pressures which try to push for a quick 
adaptation of Hungary’s international development policy to European or other 
standards are likely to be unsuccessful.  
 
As emphasized in the introduction, this research should be seen as exploratory, and all 
three sources of influence need further investigation, especially concerning the casual 
mechanics. Future research may also attempt to uncover similar dynamics in other CEE 
countries and thus provide a possibility for comparison. 
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